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Abstract. In this paper a simple model is proposed to decribe the sponta-
neous formation of coalitions among a group of actors like countries. The
basic ingredients are from the physics of disorder systems. It is the inter-
play of two different spin glass models with respectively random bond and
random site disorders which is instrumental in the present approach. The
cold war stabilty period is then given an explanation as well the instabilities
produced by the Warsow pact dissolution. European and Chiese stabilities
are also discussed.
1. Introduction
In recent years, physics has been successful in providing several models
to describe some collective behaviors in both human societies and social
organisations [1]. In particular, new light has been shed on democratic
voting biases [2], decision making process [3], outbreak of cooperation [4],
social impact [5], and power genesis in groups [6].
However such a new approach to social behavior is yet at its earlier
stage. More work is needed as well more connexion with social data. At
this stage, it is really the first ingrdients to what could become, in the near
future, a new field of research by itself. At least it is our challenge.
It is also worth to state few words of caution, since dealing with social
reality can often interfere with the reality itsel via biases in actual social
representations. One contribution of this “sociophysics” would be indeed
to take away social studies from political or philosophical beliefs, to place
it on a more modelling frame without any religion like attitude.
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In this paper we adress the question of coalition forming in the frame-
work of country military alliances, using some basic concepts from the
physics of spin glasses systems [7]. Along this line, an earlier attempt from
political sciences [8], used the physical concept of minimum energy. However
this work was misleading [9] since it was based on a confusion between the
two physically different spin glass models of Mattis and Edwards-Anderson
[10]. The model presented here, indeed involves the interplay between these
two models.
The following of the paper is organised as follows. The second part
contains the presentation of our model. Several features in the dynamics of
bimodal coalitions are obtained. Within such a framework the one country
viewpoint is studied in Section 3 showing up the frontiers of turning some
local cooperation to conflict or the opposite still preserving the belonging
to the same coalition. The setting up of world wide alliances is discussed
in section 4. The cold war situation is then analysed in section 5. A new
explanation is given in Section 6 to estern Europe instabilities following
the Warsaw pact dissolution as well as to western Europe stability. Some
hints are also obtained within the model on how to stabilize these eastern
Europe instabilities giving the still existing Nato organisation. The model
is then applied in Section 7 to describe the Chinese situation. The concept
of “risky actor” is briefly introduced in Section 8. Last Section contains
some concluding remarks.
2. Presentation of the model
We now address the problem of alignment between a group of N coun-
tries [7]. From historical, cultural and economic frames there exit bilateral
propensities Ji,j between any pair of countries i and j to either cooperation
(Ji,j > 0), conflict (Ji,j < 0) or ignorance (Ji,j = 0). Each propensity Ji,j
depends solely on the pair (i, j) itself and is positive, negative or zero.
Propensities Ji,j are somehow local since they don’t account for any global
organization or net. Their intensities vary for each pair of countries to ac-
count for the various military and economic power of both pair actors. They
are assumed to be symmetric, i.e., Jij = Jji.
From the well known saying “the enemy of an enemy is a friend” we
postulate the existence of only two competing coalitions, like for instance
western and eastern blocks during the so-called cold war. They are denoted
respectively by A and B.
Each actor has then the choice to be in either one of two coalitions. A
variable ηi associated to each actor, where index i runs from 1 to N, states
its actual belonging. It is ηi = +1 if actor i belongs to alliance A while
ηi = −1 in case it is part of alliance B. From symmetry all A-members can
SPONTANEOUS COALITION FORMING 3
turn to coalition B with a simultaneous flip of all B-members to coalition
A.
Given a pair of actors (i, j) their respective alignment is readily ex-
pressed through the product ηiηj . The product is +1 when i and j belong
to the same coalition and −1 otherwise. The “cost” of exchange between a
pair of countries is then measured by the quantity Jijηiηj.
Here factorisation over i and j is not possible. Indeed we are dealing
with competing given bonds or links. It is equivalent to random bond spin
glasses as opposed to Mattis random site spin glasses [10].
Given a configuration X of actors, for each nation i we can measure the
overall degree of conflict and cooperation with all others N − 1 countries,
with the quantity,
Ei =
n∑
j=1
Jijηj , (1)
where the summation is taken over all other countries including i itself with
Jii ≡ 0. The product ηiEi then evaluates the local “cost” associated with
country i choice. It is positive if i goes along the tendancy produced by
Ei and negative otherwise. For a given configuration X, all country local
“cost” sum up to a total “cost”,
E(X) =
1
2
∑
i
ηiEi , (2)
where the 1/2 accounts for the double counting of pairs. This “cost” mea-
sures indeed the level of satisfactions of each country alliance choice. It can
be recast as,
E(X) =
1
2
n∑
i,j
Jijηiηj , (3)
where the sum runs over the n(n − 1) pairs (i, j). Eq.(3) is indeed the
Hamiltonian of an Ising random bond magnetic system.
2.1. THE CHOSEN DYNAMICS
At this stage we postulate that the actual configuration is the one which
minimizes the cost in each countiry choice. In order to favor two cooperating
countries (Gi,j > 0) in the same alliance, we put a minus sign in from of
the expression of Eq. (3), to get,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijηiηj . (4)
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There exist by symmetry 2n/2 distinct sets of alliances since each country
has 2 choices for coalition.
Starting from any initial configuration, the dynamics of the system is
implemented by single actor coalition flips. An actor turns to the competing
coalition only if the flip decreases its local cost. The system has reached
its stable state once no more flip occurs. Given {Jij}, the {ηi} are thus
obtained minimizing Eq. (4).
Since here the system stable configuration minimizes the “energy”, we
are from the physical viewpoint, at the temperature “T = 0”. Otherwise
when “T 6= 0” it is the free-energy which has to be minimized. In practise
for a finite system the theory can tell which coalitions are possible and how
many of them exist. But when several coalitions have the same energy, it
is not possible to predict which one will be the actual one.
2.2. FRUSTRATION EFFECT
The physical concept of frustration [10] is embodied in the model. For
instance, in the case of three conflicting nations as Israel, Syria and Iraq,
any possible alliance configuration leaves always someone unsatisfied.
To define this feture more precisely; let us attach respectively the labels
1, 2, 3 to each one of the three countries. In case we have equal and negative
exchange interactions J12 = J13 = J23 = −J with J > 0, the associated
minimum of the energy (Eq. (4)) is equal to −J . However this value of the
minimum is realized for several possible and equivalent coalitions. Namely
for countries (1, 2, 3) we can have respectively alignments (A, B, A), (B, A,
A), (A, A, B), (B, A, B), (A, B, B), and (B, B, A). First 3 are identical to
last 3 by symmetry since here what matters is which countries are together
within the same coalition. The peculiar property is that the system never
gets stable in just one configuration since it costs no energy to switch from
one onto another. This case is an archetype of frustration. It means in
particular the existence of several ground states with exactly the same
energy.
Otherwise, for non equal interactions the system has one stable mini-
mum and no frustration occurs within the physical meaning defined above.
The fact that some interactions are not satisfied does not automatically
imply frustration in above sense of multiple equivalent set of alliances.
3. A one country viewpoint
We now make this point more quantitative within the present formalism.
Consider a given site i. Interactions with all others sites can be represented
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by a field,
hi =
n∑
j=1
Jijηj (5)
resulting in an energy contribution
Ei = −ηihi , (6)
to the Hamiltonian H = 1
2
∑n
i=1Ei. Eq. (10) is minimum for ηi and hi
having the same sign. For a given hi there exists always a well defined
coalition except for hi = 0. In this case site i is “neutral” since then both
coalitions are identical with respect to its local “energy” which stays equal
to zero. A neutral site will flip with probability 1
2
.
3.1. SHIFTING COALITION
The coupling {Jij} are given. Let us then assume there exists only one
minimum. Once the system reaches its stable equilibrium it gets trapped
and the energy is minimum. At the minimum the field hi can be calculated
for each site i since {Jij} are known as well as {ηi}.
First consider all sites which have the value -1. The existence of a unique
non-degenerate minimum makes associated fields also negative. We then
take one of these sites, e.g. k, and shift its value from -1 to +1 by simulta-
neously changing the sign of all its interactions {Jkl} where l runs from 1
to n (Jkk = 0). This transformation gives,
ηk = +1andhk > 0 , (7)
instead of,
ηk = −1 andhk < 0 , (8)
which means that actor k has shifted from one coalition into the other one.
It is worth to emphazise that such systematic shift of propensities of
actor k has no effect on the others actors. Taking for instance actor l, its
unique interaction with actor k is through Jkl which did change sign in the
transformation. However as actor k has also turn to the other coalition, the
associated contribution Jklηk to field hl of actor l is unchanged.
The shift process is then repeated for each member of actor k former
coalition. Once all shifts are completed there exits only one unique coalition.
Everyone is cooperating with all others. The value of the energy minimum
is unchanged in the process.
Above transformation demonstrates the {Jij} determine the stable con-
figuration. It shows in particular that given any site configuration, it always
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exists a set of {Jij} which will give that configuration as the unique mini-
mum of the associated energy. At this stage, what indeed matters are the
propensity values.
Above gauge transformation shows what matters is the sign of field {hi}
and not a given Jij value. A given set of field signs, positive and negative,
may be realized through an extremely large spectrum of {Jij}.
This very fact opens a way to explore some possible deviations from a
national policy. For instance given the state of cooperation and conflict of a
group of actors, it is possible to find out limits in which local pair propen-
sities can be modified without inducing coalition shift. Some country can
turn from cooperation to conflict or the opposite, without changing the be-
longing to a given alliance as long as the associated field sign is unchanged.
It means that a given country could becomes hostile to some former al-
lies, still staying in the same overall coalition. One illustration is given by
german recognition of Croatia against the will of other european partners
like France and England, without putting at stake its belonging to the Eu-
ropean community. The Falklands war between England and Argentina is
another example since both countries have strong american partnerships.
4. Setting up coalitions
From above analysis, countries were found to belong to some allianace with-
out apriori macro-analysis at the regional or world level. Each country is
adjusting to its best interest withg respect to countries with whom it inter-
acts. However the setting up of global coalitions which are aimed to spread
and organize economic and miulitaru exchanges produces an additional in-
gredient in each country choice.
Yet staying in the two coalition scheme, each country has an apriori
natural choice. To account for this fact we introduced for each actor i, a
variable ǫi. It is ǫi = +1 if actor would like to be in A, ǫi = −1 in B and
ǫi = 0 for no apriori. Such natural belonging is induced by cultural and
political history.
Moreover we measure exchanges produced by these coalitions trough
a set of additional pairwise propensities {Ci,j}. They are always positive
since sharing resources, informations, weapons is basically profitable. Nev-
ertheless a pair (i, j) propensity to cooperation, conflict or ignorance is
Ai,j ≡ ǫiǫjCi,j which can be positive, negative or zero. Now we do have a
Mattis random site spin glasses [10].
Including both local and macro exchanges result in an overall pair
propensity
Oi,j ≡ Ji,j + ǫiǫjCi,j , (9)
between two countries i and j with always Ji,j > 0.
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An additional variable βi = ±1 is introduced to account for benefit
from economic and military pressure attached to a given alignment. It is
still βi = +1 in favor of A, βi = −1 for B and βi = 0 for no belonging. The
amplitude of this economical and military interest is measured by a local
positive field bi which also accounts for the country size and its importance.
At this stage, the sets {ǫi} and {βi} are independent.
Actual actor choices to cooperate or to conflict result from the given set
of above quantites. The associated total cost is,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
{Ji,j + ǫiǫjCij}ηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi . (10)
5. Cold war scenario
The cold war scenario means that the two existing world level coalitions
generate much stonger couplings than purely bilateral ones, i.e., |Ji,j | < Ci,j
since to belong to a world level coalition produces more advantages than
purely local unproper relationship. In others words local propensities were
unactivated since overwhelmed by the two block trend. The overall system
was very stable. We can thus take Ji,j = 0. Moreover each actor must belong
to a coalition, i. e., ǫi 6= 0 and βi 6= 0. In that situation local propensities to
cooperate or to conflict between two interacting countries result from their
respective individual macro-level coalition belongings. the cold war energy
is,
HCW = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
ǫiǫjJijηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi . (11)
5.1. COHERENT TENDENCIES
We consider first the coherent tendency case in which cultural and econom-
ical trends go along the same coalition, i.e., βi = ǫi. Then from Eq. (15) the
minimum of HCW is unique with all country propensities satisfied. Each
country chooses its coalition according to its natural belonging, i.e., ηi = ǫi.
This result is readily proven via the variable change τ ≡ ǫiηi which turns
the energy to,
HCW1 = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijτiτj −
n∑
i
biτi , (12)
where Ci,j > 0 are positive constants. Eq. (16) is a ferromagnetic Ising
Hamiltonian in positive symmetry breaking fields bi. Indeed it has one
unique minimum with all τi = +1.
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The remarkable result here is that the existence of two apriori world
level coalitions is identical to the case of a unique coalition with every
actor in it. It shed light on the stability of the Cold War situation where
each actor satisfies its proper relationship. Differences and conflicts appear
to be part of an overall cooperation within this scenario. Both dynamics
are exactly the same since what matters is the existence of a well defined
stable configuration. However there exists a difference which is not relevant
at this stage of the model since we assumed Ji,j = 0. However in reality
Ji,j 6= 0 making the existence of two coalitions to produce a lower “energy”
than a unique coalition since then, more Ji,j can be satisfied.
It worth to notice that field terms biǫiηi account for the difference in
energy cost in breaking a pair proper relationship for respectively a large
and a small country. Consider for instance two countries i and j with bi =
2bj = 2b0. Associated pair energy is
Hij ≡ −Jijǫiηiǫjηj − 2b0ǫiηi − b0ǫjηj . (13)
Conditions ηi = ǫi and ηj = ǫj give the minimum energy,
Hmij = −Jij − 2b0 − b0 . (14)
¿From Eq. (18) it is easily seen that in case j breaks proper alignment
shifting to ηj = −ǫj the cost in energy is 2Jij + 2b0. In parallel when i
shifts to ηi = −ǫi the cost is higher with 2Jij + 4b0. Therfore the cost in
energy is lower for a breaking from proper alignment by the small country
(bj = b0) than by the large country (bj = 2b0). In the real world, it is
clearly not the same for instance for the US to be against Argentina than
to Argentina to be against the US.
5.2. UNCOHERENT TENDENCIES
We now consider the uncoherent tendency case in which cultural and eco-
nomical trends may go along opposite coalitions, i.e., βi 6= ǫi. Using above
variable change τ ≡ ǫiηi, the Hamiltonian becomes,
HCW2 = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Jijτiτj −
n∑
i
δibiτi , (15)
where δi ≡ βiǫi is given and equal to ±1. HCW2 is formally identical to the
ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in random fields ±bi. However, here the
fields are not random.
The local field term δibiτi modifies the country field hi in Eq. (9) to
hi+ δibi which now can happen to be zero. This change is qualitative since
now there exists the possibility to have “neutrality”, i.e., zero local effective
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field coupled to the individual choice. Switzerland attitude during World
war II may result from such a situation. Moreover countries which have
opposite cultural and economical trends may now follow their economi-
cal interest against their cultural interest or vice versa. Two qualitatively
different situations may occur.
− Unbalanced economical power: in this case we have
∑n
i δibi 6= 0.
The symmetry is now broken in favor of one of the coalition. But still
there exists only one minimum.
− Balanced economical power: in this case we have
∑n
i δibi = 0.
Symmetry is preserved and HCW2 is identical to the ferromagnetic
Ising Hamiltonian in random fields which has one unique minimum.
6. Unique world leader
Now we consider current world situation where the eastern block has dis-
appeared. However it is worth to emphazise the western block is still active
as before in this model. Within our notations, denoting A the western
alignment, we have still ǫi = +1 for countries which had ǫi = +1. On the
opposite, countries which had ǫi = −1 now turned to either ǫi = +1 or to
ǫi = 0.
Therefore above Ji,j = 0 assumption based on inequality |Ji,j | < |ǫiǫj |Ci,j
no longer holds for each pair of countries. In particular propensity pi,j be-
comes equal to Ji,j in respective cases where ǫi = 0, ǫj = 0 and ǫi = ǫj = 0.
A new distribution of actors results from the collapse of one block. On
the one hand A coalition countries still determine their actual choices ac-
cording to Ci,j. On the other hand former B coaltion countries are now
found to determine their choices according to competing links Ji,j which
did not automatically agree with former Ci,j. This subset of countries has
turned from a Mattis random site spin glasses without frustration into a
random bond spin glasses with frustration. In others world the former B
coalition subset has jumped from one stable minimum to a highly degen-
erated unstable landscape with many local minima. This property could
be related to the fragmentation process where ethnic minorities and states
shift rapidly allegiances back and forth while they were part of a stable
structure just few years ago.
While the B coalition world organization has disappeared, the A coali-
tion world organization did not change and is still active. It makes |Ji,j | <
Ci,j still valid for A countries with ǫiǫj = +1. Associated countries thus
maintain a stable relationship and avoid a fragmentation process. This re-
sult supports a posteriori arguments against the dissolution of Nato once
Warsaw Pact was disolved.
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Above situation could also shed some light on the european debate. It
would mean european stability is a result in particular of the existence of
european structures with economical reality. These structures produce as-
sociated propensities Ci,j much stronger than local competing propensities
Ji,j which are still there. In other words european stability would indeed
result from Ci,j > |Ji,j | and not from either all Ji,j > 0 or all Ji,j = 0. An
eventual setback of the european construction (ǫiǫjCi,j = 0) would then
automatically yield a fragmentation process with activation of ancestral
bilateral oppositions.
In this model, once a unique economical as well as military world level
organisation exists, each country interest becomes to be part of it. We thus
have βi = +1 for each actor. There may be some exception like Cuba staying
almost alone in former B alignment, but this case will not be considered
here. Associated Hamiltonian for the ǫi = 0 subset actor is,
HUL = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
Gijηiηj −
n∑
i
biηi , (16)
which is formally equivalent to a random bond Hamiltonian in a field. At
this stage ηi = +1 means to be part of A coalition which is an international
structure. On the opposite ηi = −1 is to be in a non-existing B-coalition
which really means to be outside of A.
For small field with respect to interaction the system may still exhibit
physical-like frustration depending on the various Ji,j . In this case the sys-
tem has many minima with the same energy. Perpetual instabilities thus
occur in a desperate search for an impossible stability. Actors will flip con-
tinuously from one local alliance to the other. The dynamics we are refering
to is an individual flip each time it decreases the energy. We also allow a
flip with probabilty 1
2
when local energy is unchanged.
It is worth to point out that only strong local fields may lift fragmen-
tation by putting every actor in A-coalition. It can be achieved through
economical help like for instance in Ukrainia. Another way is military A
enforcement like for instance in former Yugoslavia.
Our results point out that current debate over integrating former eastern
countries within Nato is indeed relevant to oppose current fragmentation
processes. Moreover it indicated that an integration would suppress actual
instabilities by lifting frustration.
7. The case of China
China is an extremely huge country built up from several very large states.
These state typical sizes are of the order or much larger than most other
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countries in the world. It is therefore interesting to analyse China stabil-
ity within our model since it represents a case of simultaneous Cold war
scenario and Unique world leader scenario.
There exists n states which are all part of a unique coalition which
is the chinese central state. Then all ǫi = +1 but βi = ±1 since some
states keep economical and military interest in the “union” (βi = +1)
while capitalistic advanced rich states contribute more than their share to
the “union” (βi = −1). Associated Hamiltonian is,
H = −
1
2
n∑
i>j
{Ji,j + Jij}ηiηj −
n∑
i
βibiηi , (17)
where Ci,j > 0 and Gij is positive or negative depending on each pair of
state (i, j).
At this point China is one unified country which means in particular
that Ci,j > |Gij | for all pair of states with negative Gij . Therefore ηi = +1
for each state. Moreover it also implies bi < qiCi,j where qi is the number
of states state i interacts with. Within this model, three possible scenari
can be oulined with respect to China stability.
1. China unity is preserved.
Rich states will go along their actual economic growth with the central
power turning to a capitalistic oriented federative like structure. It
means turning all ǫi to −1 with then ηi = ǫi. In parallel additional
development of poor states is required in order to maintain condition
Ci,j > |Gij | where some Gij are negative.
2. Some rich states break unity.
Central power is unchanged with the same political and economical
orientation making heavier limitations over rich state development. At
some point the condition bi > qiCi,j may be achieved for these states.
These very states will then get a lower “energy” breaking down from
chinese unity. They will shift to ηi = −1 in their alignment with the
rest of China which has ηj = +1.
3. China unity is lost with a fragmentation phenomenon.
In this case, opposition among various states becomes stronger than
the central organisational cooperation with now Ci,j < |Gij | with some
negative Gij . The situation would become spin glass-like and China
would then undergo a fragmentation process. Former China would be-
come a highly unstable part of the world.
8. The risky actor driven dynamics
In principle actors are expected to follow their proper relationship, i.e., to
minimize their local “energy”. In other words, actors follow normal and
12 S. GALAM
usual patterns of decision. But it is well known that in real life these ex-
pectations are sometimes violated. Then new situations are created with
reversal of on going policies.
To account for such situations we introduce the risky actor. It is an
actor who goes against his well defined interest. It is different from the
frustrated actor which does not have a well defined interest. Up to now
everything was done at “T = 0”. However a risky actor chooses coalition
associated to ηi = −1, although its local field hi is positive. Therefore the
existence of risky actors requires a T 6= 0 situation. The case of Rumania,
having its own independent foreign policy, in former Warsaw Pact may be
an illustration of risky actor behavior. Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus
conflict may be another example.
Once T 6= 0, it is not the energy which has to be minimized but the free
energy,
F = U − TS , (18)
where U is the internal energy, now different from the Hamiltonian and
equal to its thermal average and S is the entropy. To minimize the free
energy means stability of a group of countries matters on respective size of
each coalition but not, which actors are actually in these coalitions. At a
fixed ”temperature” we thus can expect simultaneous shift of alliances from
several countries as long as the size of the coalition is unchanged, without
any modification in the relative strenghts. Egypt quitting soviet camp in the
seventies and Afghanistan joining it may illustrate these non-destabilizing
shifts.
Within the coalition frame temperature could be viewed as a way to
account for some risky trend. It is not possible to know which particular
actor will take a chance but it is reasonable to assume the existence of some
number of risky actors. Temperature would thus be a way to account for
some global level of risk taking.
Along ideas developped elsewhere [6, 11] we can assume that a level of
risky behavior is profitable for the system as a whole. It produces surprises
which induce to reconsider some aspect of coalitions themselves. Recent
danish refusal to the signing of Maastricht agreement on closer european
unity may be viewed as an illustration of a risky actor. The net effect have
been indeed to turn what seemed a trivial and apathetic administrative
agreement into a deep and passionated debate among european countries
with respect to european construction.
Above discussion shows implementation of T 6= 0 within the present
approach of coalition should be rather fruitful. More elaboration is left for
future work.
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9. Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new way to understand the alliance form-
ing phenomena. in particular it was shown that within our model the cold
war stabilty was not the result of two opposite alliances but rather the
existence of alliance induced exchange which neutralize the conflicting in-
teractions within allies. It means that to have two alliances or jut one is
qualitatively the same with respect to stability.
From this viewpoint the strong instabilies which resulted from the War-
sow pact dissolution are given a simple explanation. Simultaneously some
hints are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation rela-
tionships. Along this line, the importance of european construction was
also underlined.
We have also given some ground to introduce non-rational behavior in
country behaviors. especially with the notions of ”risky”, ”frustrated” or
“neutral” actors. A ”risky” actor acts against his well defined interest while
a ”frustrated” actor acts randomly since not having a well defined interest.
.
At this stage, our model remains rather primitive. However it opens
some new road to explore and to forecast international policies.
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